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Two  Compar i sons
let us produce a comparison.
!e "rst entity in this comparison comprises the opening lines from Reinhard 
Bendix’s relatively early a#empt to justify the comparative method within 
sociological research:
Like the concepts of other disciplines, sociological concepts should be 
universally applicable. !e concept ‘division of labor’, for instance, refers to 
the fact that the labor performed in a collectivity is specialized; the concept 
is universal because we know of no collectivity without such specialization. 
Where reference is made to a principle of the division of labor over time – 
irrespective of the particular individuals performing the labor and of the 
way labor is subdivided (whether by sex, age, skill or whatever) – we arrive 
at one meaning of the term ‘social organization’. We know of no society that 
lacks such a principle; furthermore, we can compare and contrast the social 
organization of two societies by showing how their division of labor di$ers 
(Bendix 1963: 532).
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!e second is an extract from a chapter published just over twenty years later in 
the in"uential Writing Culture (1986a) collection, edited by James Cli#ord and 
George E. Marcus. !is collection is o$en seen as capturing a major shi$ that 
was occurring within anthropology at the time. !is approach highlighted the 
inevitable partiality of ethnographic truth and the way in which ethnographic 
accounts needed to be seen as irredeemably textual, rhetorical productions, 
through which cultures become ‘invented’ and not represented (see Cli#ord 
1986). In this section the author, Stephen Tyler, takes on what he identi%es 
as a dominant mode of ethnographic prose, rooted in ‘easy realism of natural 
history’, born out of an urge to ‘conform to the canons of scienti%c rhetoric’. Its 
problem, he writes, is
a failure of the whole visualist ideology of referential discourse, with its 
rhetoric of ‘describing’, ‘comparing’, ‘classifying’, and ‘generalizing’ and its 
presumption of representational signi%cation. In ethnography there are no 
‘things’ there to be the objects of a description, the original appearances that 
the language of description ‘re-presents’ as indexical objects for comparison, 
classi%cation, and generalization; there is rather a discourse, and that too, 
no thing (Tyler 1986: 130–31).
!is comparison provides just a glimpse into the way in which the authority 
of comparison itself has changed and been challenged over the course of the 
relatively recent history of sociology and anthropology. It locates comparison 
against two radically di#erent positions: what we might call methodological 
positivism, in Bendix’s case, and methodological relativism in Tyler’s (see 
Steinmetz 2004). !e comparison, thus, highlights two ends of comparative 
(and anti-comparative) epistemology.
Let us produce another comparison (Fig. 1.1).
!e chart uses Google’s database of scanned books, narrowed down to 
include only those that refer to either sociology or anthropology, and looks at 
the changes in how o$en comparison is referred to in these books. !e chart 
suggests that in both disciplines interest in comparison has increased since the 
beginning of the 1950s, and then peaked in anthropology in around 1960, and 
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in sociology roughly a decade later to decline and later stabilise on a much lower 
level.2 Both disciplines experience a similar rise and fall of interest in comparison.
One way we can use these comparisons is to bring them together: we can 
see that the !rst two statements map onto the historic rise and fall of compari-
son in the social sciences, with Bendix’s enthusiasm appearing at a time when 
comparison was a hot topic and Tyler’s radical critique coming at a point when 
comparison was on the way out.
In this volume we propose to re-engage the debates about comparison by 
learning from the close observation of (social) scienti!c practice. Rather than 
considering the problems of comparison as those of epistemology – for instance, 
whether we are for (Radhakrishnan 2013) or against (Friedman 2013) compari-
son, or whether certain forms of comparison are ethical and legitimate (Longxi 
2013) – we start by treating comparisons as objects of analysis and which we 
and the other authors in this collection see as involving a range of actors (human 
and non-human), practices, and tools. To take the above two comparisons as a 
comparative example, one involves us, the authors, selecting and juxtaposing 
two texts, while the other involves a tool that draws on a database of millions 
Fig. 1.1 Relative frequency of the terms ‘comparative sociology’ or ‘comparative 
anthropology’ in books scanned by Google 1950–20081
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of scanned books. As we will discuss, many comparisons are at least as complex 
and collaborative as the la!er, involving hybrid combinations of teams, funders, 
"eldtrips, and di#erent media which in turn are wrapped up in distinct cultures, 
histories, and power relations.
E p i s t emolog ica l  I n f ra s tructur e s
Our a!ention is therefore on the situated practice of comparison – an approach 
that if not rendering the various epistemological debates around comparison 
irrelevant, then at least cu!ing them down to size. $at is to say, the epistemologi-
cal challenges to comparison that have arisen over the course of the la!er half 
of the twentieth century become understood as just one part of the changing 
infrastructures of comparison, infrastructures that have at various points and 
in various di#erent ways, rendered certain forms of comparison more or less 
credible.
Given that the challenges to comparison have been well documented and 
are touched on in a number of contributions to this volume, we will not dwell 
on them for too long in this introduction. $e story, however, goes something 
like this. For a long time, comparison was seen as a crucial tool for identifying 
the universal forces that shaped social groupings, allowing analysts like Bendix 
to make the leap from the empirical to the conceptual and from the particular 
to the general. From the start this was itself guided by a contrast between the 
practices of social and natural sciences. For the social sciences, the a!ractions 
of the comparisons being produced by the natural sciences were manifold. First 
and foremost, scientists had proved themselves expert at using comparison to 
detect pa!erns of similarity and di#erence. Comparison also underpinned ideals 
of scienti"c rigour. Without it, neither principles of experimental replication, nor 
hypothesis testing, nor tests of statistical signi"cance, would function. Within 
the social sciences, therefore, the hope was that by transferring a comparative 
method, its researchers might be able to emulate their natural scienti"c cousins 
and divide the world into "xed properties. $is would allow them to identify 
not the natural laws of life, but its social laws.
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However, a series of developments threatened this ambition, some of the 
e!ects of which we could try to tentatively map onto the above graph. "e most 
major of these developments seemed, at #rst at least, to pertain to one discipline 
more than any other: anthropology. Anthropology seemed particularly want-
ing in the context of the major geopolitical shi$s of the time. "e 1960s and 
1970s saw signi#cant questions raised about its potential complicity with the 
European colonial project, whose damaging e!ects were becoming increasingly 
hard to ignore (see Gingrich and Fox 2002: 2). Comparison had moved from 
being an epistemological practice to being a political one. Seen from the per-
spective of this volume, this was not only a conceptual shi$, but one in which 
the infrastructure of comparison had become newly problematic. Comparison 
was seen as an extension of colonialism, in which the infrastructure of colonial-
ism served as a carrier for an epistemic project of subjecting other forms of life. 
"e emergent issue centred on the fact that the people who embarked on the 
doing of comparison did so by means which were seen as compromising the 
very epistemological basis of their work.
"e 1980s saw what might have seemed as narrow disciplinary-speci#c 
concerns %ood into a number of other areas within the social sciences. First, the 
kinds of issues that had been raised within anthropology were shown to be as 
relevant to other disciplines. "is became connected to a further set of a&acks. 
A series of intellectual challenges, including Nietzschean perspectivism, post-
structuralist deconstruction, postcolonial and feminist critiques, and research 
within science and technology studies (STS), shook many of the pillars upon 
which social science had been resting (see Dickens and Fontana 1994; Keane 
2005). "ese threatened to destabilise the claim of the methods and writing 
practices of social research to be able to truthfully represent social life. "ey 
also threatened the idea, captured in the extract by Bendix above, that analytical 
concepts could be simply ‘extracted’ from empirical se&ings and made to circulate 
independently. In part this was because of the argument that di!erent se&ings, 
di!erent encounters between researcher and researched, possessed an inher-
ent incommensurability (see Jensen 2011; Steinmetz 2004; Strathern 1988); 
in other words, they simply could not be compared in a meaningful way. And 
in part this was because of a suspicion of the very plausibility of concepts that 
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could be ‘transcendent’. A!ention also turned towards researchers themselves. 
A range of work revealed research practice as always situated and never inno-
cent from the values and biases of the researcher (see Haraway 1989; Harding 
1986). Rather than the ships and practices of the colonials, the heads and bodies 
of researchers became the focus for the critique of comparison. Such conclu-
sions also threatened the standard against which social science had previously 
measured itself: the natural sciences. As STS researchers showed, biases could 
readily be found here too (Latour 1988). Some of this critique is in"ected in 
both Writing Culture (Cli#ord and Marcus 1986b) and Tyler’s extract above.
Here, then, we can observe a shi$ from what we might call the colonial 
critique. In the colonial critique it was the global infrastructures of colonialism 
that were seen as fundamental obstacles to forms of meaningful comparison. %e 
re"exive and epistemological critique, by contrast, while recognising key aspects 
of this argument, shi$s a!ention from global practices and power relations to 
the individual. It is a critique that looks at comparisons as problematic e#ects of 
writing, which are seen to do violence to the uniqueness of the circumstances 
of the research subjects.
As we move closer to the present, we see that many if not all of these ques-
tions have lost li!le of their relevance.3 While many social scientists may have 
rowed back from more strident anti-realist stances that characterised some of 
the postmodernist academic discourse in the 1980s and into the 1990s, there 
is li!le sense of a desire to return to the kind of methodological positivism 
that preceded these challenges. Feminist and postcolonial research and STS, 
meanwhile, in their moves towards a more constructivist understanding of the 
composition of the social and material world, continue to challenge the assumed 
neutrality of research and its claims towards objectivity.
With the increased normalisation of constructivism, however, we can &nd 
one further important but o$en quite implicitly articulated recent reappraisal 
of the status of comparison. While the postmodernist critique of comparison 
was that meaningful comparison is impossible because of the damage done to 
the entities under comparison, the constructivist critique adopts the seemingly 
opposite point of view: comparison, it is argued, is ubiquitous, as can be seen in 
the o$en cited words of Evans Pritchard that ‘there is only one method […] the 
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comparative method. And that [method] is impossible’ (used as an epigraph in 
both Peacock (2002) and Jensen (2011)). Comparison thus becomes meaning-
less, but for quite di!erent reasons: what becomes challenged is the idea that 
social science could deploy a comparative practice that is distinct from the 
comparative practices inherent to the world. As with the re"exivist critique, this 
view also tends to suggest that comparison is a purely epistemic practice. From 
such a point of view, there is indeed nothing special about comparison. As we 
will proceed to outline, however, what such a view ignores are the particularities 
and the practices through which social science does comparison.
Given these continuing epistemological concerns about comparison, the 
changes in academic practice that our chart at the start of this chapter indicated 
should not be surprising. Within many academic departments, the challenges 
documented above have markedly improved the status and authority of non-
comparative, small scale, case-study oriented, qualitative and ethnographic 
research. New seemingly non-comparative methods have also taken hold: 
Actor-Network #eory (ANT), for instance, and the more loose assembly 
of research practices which it has in"uenced, has exhibited a suspicion of the 
imposition of transcendent categories into the research situation (see Law 
and Hassard 1999; Latour 2005). As Bruno Latour famously put it, ‘nothing 
is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else’ (1988: 158). #is 
principle is at the heart of ANT, in which the researcher does not assume an a 
priori separation between social and material in the conduct of research. #e 
researcher’s main job in this situation is to identify the breaks that allow the 
production of continuity (e.g. the continuity of scienti$c practice), rather than 
introducing these breaks him or herself by leaping to a di!erent comparative 
se%ing (see Latour 2013: 33).
Comparat i v e  Open ing s ?
#ere are, then, a considerable number of actors exerting a potentially strong 
pull against the use of comparative approaches. Despite this, and against the 
odds perhaps, we may be seeing the door to comparative social scienti$c 
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practice opening a li!le wider than it has done for some time. A number 
of books and journal collections have begun to reinvestigate questions of 
comparison. "ese have taken on important unresolved questions of epis-
temology – for instance, examining whether poles as seemingly opposed as 
comparison and relativism can, in fact, be placed into productive dialogue 
(see Jensen (2011) and others in the Comparative Relativisim Special Issue). 
"ey have also begun, with some overlaps with the concerns of this book, to 
unpick some of the challenges that face those interested in developing dif-
ferent, potentially more productive and potentially more re#exive forms of 
comparative practice. "is includes asking how comparison might become 
‘thicker’ (Sche$er and Niewöhner 2010), more relational (Ward 2010; Cook 
and Ward 2012), and/or more modest, postcolonial and a!entive to modalities 
of di$erence (McFarlane and Robinson 2012; Robinson 2011; and others in 
the Comparative Urbanism Special Issue).
"ere has been a very visible push by funders for researchers to adopt 
comparative methods (see in this volume, Akrich and Rabeharisoa, Deville et 
al., Stöckelová). For instance, the stated rationale accompanying the regula-
tory foundation for the EU’s funding programme for the 2014 to 2020 period 
(known as Horizon 2020) points to the need for comparison given the increas-
ing ‘complexity’ of the challenges facing Europe. "ese are challenges that ‘go 
beyond national borders and thus call for more complex comparative analyses 
to develop a base upon which national and European policies can be be!er 
understood’ (European Union 2013: 162).
"ere is another actor that has the potential to pull comparison in a di$erent 
direction, and that is STS. "is might be surprising, given that it is one of the 
subdisciplines that has both opened up the contingencies of knowledge produc-
tion, while also developing what seems to be a non-comparative methodology. 
However, STS appears to be o$ering important practical pointers towards what 
the development of a new, less hamstrung comparative practice might look like.
First, STS is doing comparison. Bruno Latour’s recent major work, An Enquiry 
into Modes of Existence, quite explicitly puts comparison to work. Its ambition 
is to examine the productivity of pu!ing, side by side, 15 di$erent ‘modes’ 
through which existence is produced. Latour talks about comparison as a ‘test’, 
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the criteria for which are implied in the following questions (if the answers to 
each are negative, then comparison can be considered to have failed its test):
Do we gain in quality by crossing several ontological templates in order to 
evaluate, li!le by li!le, what is distinctive about each one? And, an even more 
daunting subtest: do we gain in verisimilitude by treating all the modes at 
once in such a move of envelopment? (Latour 2013: 478)
We are back, then, to questions of similarity and di"erence. And to the ability 
of comparison to make a di!erence. What’s more, ‘irreduction’ is revealed in the 
book not as the principle that should underpin all investigations of social life, but 
rather a particular way (albeit a crucially important one in the history of STS) to 
follow one of the #$een ‘modes’: the ‘network’ mode. By virtue of its capacity to 
di"erentiate, comparison inevitably engages in activities of reduction. However, 
this should not be seen as necessarily problematic: reduction is productive not 
of ‘less’ in any simple way but rather di"erence (see Robinson, this volume). 
As such, it is an operation as indispensible to analysis as it is to life (see Bryant 
2013; Halewood 2011).4 In Latour’s recent book, the role of comparison can be 
seen as assisting us in distinguishing between (productive) reductions.
%e fact that – whether for pragmatic or intellectual reasons – comparative 
research is being done by STS researchers o"ers an opportunity. Here we have a 
body of researchers trained in the very art of detecting how scienti#c techniques 
and technologies a"ect the production of knowledge, using a method which 
has been so o$en criticised for how it does just that. Undertaking an analysis of 
their own research (as many in this book have done) and not just the research 
practices of others, may help us determine in practice what the dangers and 
opportunities of comparison actually are for social science (see Deville et al.; 
Stöckelová; and Akrich & Rabharisoa in this volume).
%is leads to the second point. And that is that STS is, or at least it could be, 
well placed to hesitate, to slow down and recognise the power and potential of 
its own comparative practices before making assumptions about comparison. 
Many critics of comparative practice make rapid leaps between ‘comparison’, 
‘classi#cation’, ‘generalisation’, and the production of knowledge understood 
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as ‘scienti!c’ and/or ‘objective’. "is obscures the translations and mediations 
that need to occur for each of these terms to have the power to de!ne the 
other. Webb Keane has opened up some of these moves by demonstrating how 
in some social scienti!c se#ings the suspicion of comparison can be traced 
back to a very particular ethical project constructed in direct opposition to 
what he calls a ‘hypostasized version of science’ (Keane 2005: 85). "is is 
important. As Stengers reminds us, ‘[e]xperimental sciences are not objective 
because they would rely on measurement alone. In their case, objectivity is 
not the name for a method but for an achievement’ (Stengers 2011: 50). It is 
a very particular type of achievement to tie comparison to the production of 
the very particular kinds of knowledge that scienti!c methodologies seek to 
produce. It is perfectly possible for comparison to be directed towards quite 
di$erent ends.
The  Us e s  of  Compar i son
To help us understand exactly how and why comparison is neither inherently 
innocent nor guilty of the various charges that have been levelled against it, we 
seek in this volume to accomplish two goals. Some of the articles focus on either 
one of these twin aspects, some on both. First, we seek to analyse how compari-
son is done, and second, we seek more productive ways of doing comparison, 
in part by challenging conventional comparative practices. To accomplish these 
goals it is important to accept the two points made above: !rst, that comparison 
indeed is a particular research practice, rather than merely a ubiquitous cognitive 
operation; second, that comparison as a research practice is necessarily reductive, 
and this is not in itself problematic.
Rather than dwelling on the epistemological concerns outlined above, 
then, it makes sense to look in more detail into the di$erent uses of compari-
son and to begin to be able to ask critical questions about where and in what 
ways we practise comparison and with what ambitions in mind. We maintain 
here, as do the authors in this collection in various ways, that comparison can 
and should have uses that move far away from how it has been understood 
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previously. We also maintain that focusing on the uses of comparison can 
help to free us from many of the a!endant epistemological worries (see also 
Krause on this issue).
"us rather than insisting on the problems associated with previous com-
parative research, and making an exception for non-comparative qualitative 
research in the mistaken assumption that it is automatically less reductionist, 
we insist that research is in itself a risky and necessarily reductive practice. "is 
means that we should therefore ask where and when we want to reduce and 
with what goals in mind.5
Competition, for instance, is a particularly radical and o#en harmful form of 
comparison, as for example when it puts entities into a contest without having 
a theory of what guides the outcomes (for example, in the case of measuring 
academic productivity (see de Rijcke et al.)). Or there is comparison as critique 
(see Krause): it shares with competition the idea that we can use another object 
to assess the object in front of us; to understand what is good or bad about this 
object, or if we need another object that is di$erent from, and be!er or worse 
than, whatever we are interested in. A number of writers have also noted how 
comparison may be pedagogic and creative: it allows the person or entity doing 
the comparison to learn from having objects, arguments, statements, and empiri-
cal phenomena contrasted with each other and, as a result of this contrast, for 
each to potentially emerge more clearly de%ned than before (see Schmidt 2008: 
339; Stengers 2011: 62).
Compar i son  a s  Creat i v i t y
With this starting point established, it now becomes possible to compare dif-
ferent ways in which entities are constructed through comparison. "e focus 
can thus move from criticising the construction of categories per se and the 
brutality with which objects are forced into categories through comparison, to 
analysing various forms of category creation. "e construction of entities, and 
the reduction of the world in accordance with such entities, becomes visible as a 
process that is di&cult, certainly, but also adventurous and creative. "roughout 
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this volume, we can observe a number of such strategies. !ey all con"dently 
establish categories, yet do so in a re#ective and sometimes playful way.
!e "rst strategy is to undermine the seeming self-evidence of the categories 
being used in a particular comparative undertaking, as can be seen in the articles 
by Akrich and Rabeharisoa, and Deville et al. In both studies, the self-evident 
category appears to be the state, yet in each case the authors dismantle the idea 
of a state as either homogeneous or consistent in di$erent se%ings; instead the 
category of the state divides into various subsets, containing a varied and unpre-
dictable selection of entities. In both, then, it turns out that states are above all 
convenient starting places for research, for the simple reason that they provide 
distinct legal and organisational contexts in which the research objects (patient 
groups and disaster management) operate.
A second version compares comparisons between social scientists and the 
"eld (see, to varying degrees, Akrich and Rabeharisoa, Deville et al., Gad and 
Jensen, Lutz, and Meyer). !e idea here is based on the ubiquity of comparison 
in a context distinct from social science. !is is a re#exive move which follows 
many other forms of constructive re#exivity in the social sciences. For exam-
ple, Boltanksi and !évenot’s theory of justi"cation is built on the observation 
that critique is not only in the hands of social scientists but also part of lay dis-
course, and that critical theory thus needs to turn into a theory of how critique 
is practised (Boltanski and !évenot 1991). !e re#exive comparisons in this 
volume similarly start with the observation of pre-existing comparisons in the 
"eld and use these to rethink the comparative practices of social science. !e 
conclusions that stem from such a rethinking di$er, however: some authors 
argue that social science should follow the comparisons in the "eld (Gad and 
Jensen, Lutz), while others maintain that there is something distinct about 
an explicitly directed social scienti"c approach to comparison (Akrich and 
Rabeharisoa, Deville et al., Meyer).
A third version creates di$erent entities by turning towards asymmetrical 
comparison. Comparative asymmetries o&en follow from the need to discover 
the tertium comparationis. While normally the tertium comparationis is assumed 
to dictate the category of objects being compared (a state being compared with 
other states, etc.), it may help to embrace forms of analysis that shi& across 
29
introduction
multiple comparative registers, with no desire to produce cleanly balanced 
comparisons. Categories of object might be compared with each other, with 
then further comparisons brought into play by shi!ing across di"erent planes – 
across not just space but also time, for instance (see the discussion of Faria’s 
chapter below).
The  Comparator  and  the  Practis ing  of  Comparison
To claim that comparison is always grounded in infrastructure forces us to 
analyse the relationship between such infrastructures and the practices of 
comparison. #is volume is thus also concerned with the ‘ni$y-gri$y’ or the 
practical level of comparative practices as they are deployed across various social 
scienti%c comparative projects, the o!en unseen and unremarked dimensions 
of comparison upon which research practice nonetheless u$erly depends. 
Akrich and Rabeharisoa, Deville et al., and Stöckelová each conduct types 
of auto-ethnography to show the diverse ways in which comparisons can be 
done. #ese contributions clearly show that comparative research hinges on a 
multiplicity of factors ranging from a particular zeitgeist (or research fashion), 
to the project structure and proposals made to funders, to the inner workings 
of the entity conducting the comparison. #e la$er is an entity we call the 
‘comparator’ (Deville et al., this volume).
Let us take, %rst, the in&uence of funders. #e priorities laid down for 
researchers by funding agencies in&uence the choice of the %eld to be studied 
and the planning and conduct of the individual steps of the project. #e pro-
ject has to make sense to the funders in order to be able to come into existence. 
And here is the paradox: some funders, particularly the EU under the various 
Framework Programmes, now prefer projects that have an element of interna-
tional collaboration looking at the same topic. #erefore numerous academic 
teams based in multiple countries come together and ‘do’ comparisons. Very 
o!en, these comparisons are between nations (or more loosely, between prac-
tices situated in di"erent places), but the sheer scale of EU funds o!en renders 
projects comparative on other axes as well. #e availability of large-scale funding 
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thus spurs a new kind of comparison which very o!en does not have its main 
purpose grounded in research problems. At least as o!en, such comparisons 
are driven by the political need of the EU to make sense of the EU as a ‘union’ 
of cultural practices and their internal di"erences. #ey are also driven by the 
fact that for large-scale research projects in the social sciences, ‘comparison’ 
is a convenient way of distributing and accounting for work. And $nally, it 
is a way of making sense of individual subprojects of large-scale projects and 
claiming some kind of unifying theme of the work. It is unclear and has been 
barely analysed how such new forms of comparison relate to older formats. 
And, while earlier comparative practices, particularly in anthropology, tried to 
make sense of the ‘periphery’, the new EU funding regime looks at comparison 
to understand di"erences within the centre or to understand the relationship 
of centre and periphery.6 #is has also brought a new form of relationship 
between centre and periphery: this new model of comparative research does 
not centralise comparative practice, but rather assigns each $eld site its own 
usually ‘local’ research team. In other words, we can observe a move from an 
anthropological comparative strategy, in which researchers are strangers, to a 
sociological one (see Stöckelová).
Second, comparative work hinges on the set-up and running of the compara-
tor – the human and non-human entity that jointly produces comparison (see 
Deville et al.). Humans combine their sensory and organisational apparatuses 
with those of tools and machines. Comparators are unique too, and vary between 
each project. #ey are assembled in part in accordance with the funding proposal, 
which details the number of their human and nonhuman parts and outlines 
modality of their work, while their shape and speci$c forma%ing also changes 
as the projects progress.
It seems that the im/balance between humans and nonhumans within a com-
parator profoundly impacts the modus operandi of work and its results. #is is 
most tangible when comparing (again!) the work of single human researchers 
to that undertaken by teams. #e advantage of comparators including a single 
person is that much of the comparator is located in one person, and thus many 
of its decisions do not need to be made explicit during the research process. 
One person’s own intuition and preferences shape what is being researched and 
31
introduction
what lines of enquiry are being pursued. It is only when the comparator runs 
into problems, or when comparative research practice needs to be explained 
(as in academic texts), that the underlying assumptions of the comparator are 
made explicit.
Comparators that contain several persons face di!erent kinds of opportuni-
ties and challenges. Most importantly, collaborative work tends to depend on 
making things explicit, and specifying and homogenising the comparator in 
far more detail. "erefore, assembling the comparator is a crucial element of 
comparison. Teams also choose di!erent strategies for calibrating their compara-
tors – allowing people, technologies, and other actors to adjust to each other 
and achieve ‘compatible’ ways of seeing and digesting data. "is can include 
reading seminars, workshops, joint #eldwork, and so on. "e scalar challenges 
of cross-national comparative projects, particularly favoured by large funding 
bodies, also increase the di$culties of making a comparator work (see Akrich 
and Rabeharisoa; Lutz; and Stöckelová, this volume). So too do the non-human 
parts of a comparator. All researchers also rely on a range of infrastructural tools 
to enable the conduct of their research. Luhmann was lost without his #ling cabi-
net; ethnographic researchers would be lost without their notebook. Although 
tending to focus more on the natural sciences, STS has shown us repeatedly 
how such socio-material infrastructure can shape the conduct and outcomes of 
research. "e #elds themselves (and their various actors) also become part of 
the comparator and in%uence and shi& our notion of comparison. "is volume 
is full of accounts of how people and objects in the #eld change the course of 
comparative practice. And #nally, the objects under examination possess dif-
ferent qualities to the researcher that make them comparable in di!erent ways 
(see Faria, this volume).
If we think of the ways in which comparison is used, together with the vari-
ous elements involved in practically doing comparison – beginning with the 
role of research funders, the internal set-up of the comparator and #nally the 
role of the #eld itself – we can immediately see that the question of what is at 
stake when practising comparison cannot, and could never have been, whether 
comparison is good or bad, or whether it should be avoided. "e question is 
rather which comparisons and which comparative infrastructures we want to 
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implicate ourselves in, what we seek to understand with them, how we set up 
our comparator, and how we want it to relate to the !eld. "ere is no single, 
correct procedure for doing comparison, no correct answer to the question of 
what a good comparison is or should be. What the contributions to this book 
can do instead is to highlight some of their comparative decisions and selections, 
and some of the problems and con#icts that contributed towards comparisons 
being performed as they were.
Overv i ew  of  the  Book
"e book is divided into three sections. "e !rst, Logics, deals with how scholars 
of di$erent disciplines conceive the rules of doing comparison. It o$ers an analy-
sis of di$erent objections and/or challenges to these rules, including situations 
where assumptions about comparison become a barrier to comparison itself.
When we speak about practising comparison, it is too easily forgo%en that 
how we do comparison is guided to a great extent by books on method, meth-
odological fashions, and previous comparative examples. A struggle common 
to all the contributions to the book is the very restricted ideas of comparison 
that exist amongst the imagery, methods, texts, and implicit rules of various 
disciplines.
"e !rst two chapters take issue with such rules and constraints in very 
di$erent ways. Monika Krause, in ‘Comparative Research: Beyond Linear-
causal Explanation’, sets out to liberate comparison from its theory. She raises 
a charge: that comparative practice has su$ered from an overly restrictive idea 
of comparison, one based on forms of ‘like with like comparisons’ drawn from 
ideas about linear causal explanation, with yet deeper roots in the randomised 
control trial. Measured against such standards, most comparisons of the social 
sciences fall short. Yet Krause maintains that social scienti!c comparison very 
o&en has quite di$erent aims and that these should be conceived of according 
to di$erent conceptual terms. She suggests that social scienti!c comparison 
instead o&en aims at be%er description, concept development, and critique, 
while providing explanations distinct from those of other disciplines. Such goals, 
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then, imply the use of di!erent kinds of comparison, ranging from what she calls 
‘like with unlike comparisons’, to ‘asymmetrical comparisons’, to ‘hypothetical 
comparisons’, or to ‘undigested comparisons’.
Alice Santiago Faria takes a di!erent route, trying to "nd a new logic of 
comparison from within a particular case. In her chapter, ‘Cross Comparison: 
Comparisons across Architectural Displays of Colonial Power’, she begins by 
analysing the logic of comparison in architectural history and theory. #is logic, 
she maintains, is focused on comparing either buildings from the same building 
type, the same epoch, or the same style (typical ‘like with like comparisons’, 
in Krause’s parlance). Yet, drawing on her research on colonial architecture in 
Goa (India), she shows that focusing on the categories that guide architectural 
history does not illuminate the logic of colonial architecture. According to Faria, 
colonial architecture can be characterised as the display of power through the 
most prominent building type of a given epoch. #is leads her to compare a 
Goan cathedral from the sixteenth century with a British-Indian train station 
from the nineteenth century. #ese buildings are radically di!erent in terms of 
the traditional logic of architectural history: they come from di!erent times, 
are built in di!erent styles, and are di!erent building types. Yet this apparent 
incommensurability comes to provide the very basis for a set of novel compara-
tive movements.
#e second section, titled Collaborations, deals with the various organisa-
tional, interactional, and political problems arising within collaborative research 
projects which are o$en strongly promoted by political donor entities, such as 
the EU. Project teams admit that collaboration can be laborious, as it brings 
unexpected challenges and twists when the imagined research ideas come to 
life and deal with incongruent realities of the "eld and diverse research practices 
across di!erent academic traditions. It appears that the way the comparator 
(i.e. the entity that carries out the comparative work) is assembled and put to 
work determines what is and is not studied and put into mutual relation. In 
other words, collaborations shape the object of comparison just as the object 
shapes collaborations. #is process involves endless adjustments or processes of 
calibration, through negotiations where hierarchies, personal relations, politics, 
and pragmatism co-produce the "nal end product – the outcome of research 
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projects. Comparison is thus o!en not a singular act but a continual collabora-
tive process undertaken throughout projects, from their inception as proposals 
to the process of analysis and writing.
In their chapter, ‘Same, Same but Di"erent: Provoking Relations, Assembling 
the Comparator’, Deville, Guggenheim, and Hrdličková give a new meaning 
to the term comparator, as has already been described. $eir chapter calls for 
more a%ention to be paid to the contingent practices in which the comparator 
becomes assembled, fed, and calibrated, as it determines how objects of study are 
approached, and continually interacted with. Such mutual interaction can pro-
voke further comparisons and realign the comparator. $eir auto-ethnographic 
narrative, about carrying out a seemingly conventional comparison of disaster 
preparedness practices across three countries (the UK, Switzerland, and India), 
tells how various unanticipated factors, such as varied levels of access, absences 
or presences of certain phenomena, made the comparator devise coping strate-
gies and realign the whole outlook of the project. $is leads to some interesting 
&ndings which would not have come to light had the conventional rules of 
comparing ‘like with like’ been strictly applied.
Madeleine Akrich and Vololona Rabeharisoa in ‘Pulling Oneself Out of the 
Traps of Comparison: An Autoethnography of a European Project’ recount 
the proceedings of their EU-funded project looking at patient organisations 
dealing with four di"erent health conditions in four European countries. $ey 
concede that pragmatism was a guiding principle for the duration of the project. 
In the application stage, their research proposal was a strategic compromise 
between their intellectual interest in knowledge practices and the funder’s 
demands for an international/comparative/collaborative dimension. $ey 
thus deployed categories, narratives, and forms of reasoning which were not 
necessarily close to their interests, but that were crucial for obtaining the 
funding. $eir comparative work thus did not result in typologies, as their 
research proposal might have suggested, but rather in multi-sited observations. 
Along the way they were producing and constantly calibrating comparators 
that would allow them to grasp singularities and commonalities, achieving a 
kind of common interpretive framework through sets of tools, instructions, 
and open discussions.
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Re!ecting on two of her research projects in the late 2000s – following 
women in science in "ve EU countries and the introduction of excellence 
frameworks in academia in the Czech Republic – Tereza Stöckelová’s chapter 
‘Frame Against the Grain: Asymmetries, Interference, and the Politics of EU 
Comparison’ raises the important issue of the conventions and forms of poli-
tics that permeate contemporary comparative practices in the social sciences 
in Europe (and, likely, elsewhere). Drawing on her own experience, she "nds 
that research designs o#en correspond and speak to the (pre)existing political 
realities, infrastructures, and imaginations that are de"ned by funders, invoking 
unhelpful categories and comparative practices; further, that this imagination 
is reinforced through the multiple, recurring executions of projects reproduc-
ing these speci"c frames, units, and asymmetries. In making a case for a more 
critical form of collaborative comparison, she argues for social scientists and 
funders to go against the grain and to commit to creating investigative frictions 
by not allowing prevailing notions to dominate.
$e third section is Relations. As we have alluded to above, comparison 
inevitably involves the forging of new connections between objects, persons, 
and many other entities besides (e.g. concepts, discourses, feelings, places, 
cities, states, and so on and so forth). $e contributions to this section each in 
their various ways explore the consequences of this comparative relationality. In 
particular, they examine the forms of relation within which researchers become 
implicated in and through the particularities of "eldwork, with an a%ention 
to how comparative practice becomes shaped by the objects of comparison, 
including by the sometimes explicit, sometimes more implicit, comparisons 
that these objects perform.
Christopher Gad and Casper Bruun Jensen’s paper on ‘Lateral Comparisons’ 
shi#s authority for the production of comparison away from the social scientist 
to the "eld itself. Given that the "eld is densely populated with comparison, 
something a number of other contributors also note, they invite social scientists 
to allow themselves to travel on a journey with this existing and multifarious 
comparative endeavour in order to begin a process of ‘inventing around’ these 
practices. In outlining how this might be achieved, they focus on the compari-
sons that take place in and around a particular site: a Danish "shery inspection 
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vessel. !is involves paying a"ention to comparative relations that are put into 
play by both humans – notably the crew and #shing $eet inspectors – and a 
variety of non-humans, ranging from navigational aids to technologies that bring 
ships into direct comparative relation through monitoring activities. Practising 
comparison as a social scientist, then, is an act somewhere between a le"ing-go 
and a more active e%ort to resist the imposition of a layer of comparison on top 
of, and beyond, the various other, and o&en powerful, comparisons that are to 
be found once s/he starts looking.
!is theme is taken up by Peter Lutz in ‘Comparative Tinkering with Care 
Moves’. Like Gad and Bruun Jensen, Lutz draws a"ention to the signi#cance 
of comparative relations that already exist in the sites we study. In his case, this 
is senior home care and its movements and acts of transformation. A key point 
of di%erence between the two papers (one inevitably emerging from compari-
son!) is that Lutz also examines how such ‘found comparisons’, as one could 
call them, might (or might not) enter into productive relation with what might 
seem to be the more arbitrary comparisons that a social scientist might want to 
perform (and indeed ‘impose’). For Lutz, this is the a"empt to bring together 
two sites that are spatially disconnected and organisationally and culturally 
quite distinct – senior home care in Sweden and the United States. !rough 
a process that at once is re$exive about his own previous practice as a social 
scientist and takes the relations of comparison within #eld se"ings seriously, 
Lutz comes to advocate a process of comparative ‘tinkering’. !is involves rec-
ognising the relational composition of comparison in-between the researcher 
and the researched and the ongoing adjustments that are required, as well as 
frictions that emerge, in the construction (and recognition) of comparison. One 
consequence of the tinkered comparison, he suggests, is to disturb some of the 
more conventional, standardised categories of comparison that are o&en rolled 
out uncritically within the social sciences.
In the next chapter, by Sarah de Rijcke, Iris Wallenburg, Paul Wouters, 
and Roland Bal (‘Comparing Comparisons: On Rankings and Accounting 
in Hospitals and Universities’), it becomes quite clear just what is at stake 
when some of these conventional categories of comparison begin to become 
deployed against the outputs of workers, including academic workers. Many 
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readers of this book will already be experiencing the e!ects on their everyday 
practices of the increasing metricisation of academic outputs and, as a direct 
consequence, the rise of the comparative and competitive ranking of universi-
ties. By comparing ranking systems within Dutch universities to those used 
within hospitals, the paper examines just how such systems come into being, 
some of their performative e!ects, as well as, in a "nal ‘jump’ with parallels to 
Lutz’s approach, re#ecting on how this particular comparative technology sits 
against their own comparative practice. $is helps reveal how uncomfortable it 
can be to at once be situated as an object of comparison and an analyst of this 
objecti"cation, as well as the centrality of commensuration to all comparative 
practices. As the authors suggest, such acts of commensuration can come into 
tension with a researcher’s desire (one common to STS researchers) to a%end 
to empirical phenomena symmetrically.
Morgan Meyer, in the book’s "nal empirical chapter (‘Steve Jobs, Terrorists, 
Gentlemen, and Punks: Tracing the Strange Comparisons of Biohackers’), 
further pursues the tack of re#exively analysing his own comparative practices 
against those of his respondents, here ‘biohackers’. $ese are individuals, inspired 
by the ethics of hacking and open source, who seek to mess with biology in a 
wide variety of ways. Including in his own previous work, Meyer "nds that, 
in trying to pin down just what biohacking is and what it aims to achieve, it is 
something of a trope to place its practices into comparative relation, whether it 
be to terrorists, Steve Jobs, or seventeenth-century gentleman amateurs (or to 
many others besides). $e task Meyer takes on is to uncover exactly what these 
various comparisons do to biohacking and biohackers. What he uncovers are 
a series of frames that shape how ‘we’, as scholars, and ‘they’, as practitioners, 
understand those ‘yet-to-be-named transformative individuals working in biol-
ogy’, as Meyer at points calls them (given that the very term biohacking operates 
in a particular comparative register). Comparison is shown to be a deeply value-
laden operation, one routinely involved in the construction of social identities. 
At the same time, Meyer suggests that such problematics of comparison cannot 
simply be solved by be%er, denser, ‘thicker’ description. Instead, comparativ-
ists – if that’s what we (whether we like it or not) are – should be content to leave 
comparison as they "nd it, to allow it to exist in all its multiplicity and muddle.
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!e book ends with an A"erword by Jennifer Robinson, titled ‘Spaces of 
Comparison and Conceptualisation’. In it, she responds to some of the questions 
the essays raise. In navigating her way through these contributions, Robinson 
is drawn to asking a"er the spatialities of comparison, as part of an ambition 
to forge a revitalised comparative imagination. On the one hand, she argues, 
comparison is o"en thought/imagined/done in such a way as to reduce the 
spatial contingencies composition of that which is being compared (the case, 
the local, the city, the global, for instance). On the other, a#ending to spatial 
speci$city (indeed, singularity) and to the way that such speci$city can, in 
both theory and practice, enter into relation with an e%ectively in$nite range 
of other entities, opens the door to comparative multiplicity. Here determin-
ing the ‘shared’ and ‘di%erent’ registers of life and experience demands not a 
comparative universalism, but an approach to comparison that is modest and 
open to revision.
!is suggests that practising comparison involves not a de$nitive $xing of 
the qualities of the world but a ‘holding steady’ just long enough for questions 
of di%erence and similarity to come into view. !is requires considerable 
work to bring logics, collaborations, and relations together with compara-
tive infrastructures, $eld sites, research teams, objects, and technologies, 
as well as the power dynamics that inevitably cross-cut them. Analysing 
exactly what is at stake in this endeavour is what we hope this volume will 
begin to achieve.
Note s
1 Using Google Ngram viewer. Percentage obtained by dividing total occurrence of terms 
(case insensitive) by the corresponding total occurrence of either the terms sociology/
sociological or anthropology/anthropological (in order to control for an overall increase or 
decrease in the la#er). 2008 is the most recently available data. A smoothing of 3 applied, 
using Ngram’s smoothing function. See original analysis at h#p://tinyurl.com/orgo9cs. 
2 A similar analysis with IBISS, a database with journal articles, returns similar curves 
of ascendancy and fall, but with peaks for both disciplines roughly a decade later. Given 
the critiques around the authoritative production of knowledge we explore below, we are 
particularly keen to point out that we see these more as rough indicators of tendencies 
39
introduction
more than any de!nitive representation of trends. Far more work would need to be done 
to establish these tendencies !rmly and authoritatively.
3 Concerns about comparison are of course not distributed evenly. Some countries’ 
anthropological and sociological traditions move forwards to a greater or less degree 
unconcerned by such a"acks. George Steinmetz, for instance, argues that much US 
sociology ‘still seems to be operating according to a basically positivist framework, perhaps 
even a crypto-positivist one’ (Steinmetz 2005: 276). Beyond sociology and anthropology, 
the extent to which these challenges have been taken seriously within the social sciences 
varies considerably. Within cultural studies, cultural geography, and politics, particularly in 
parts of Europe, you may well !nd a similar situation. Venture, however, into economics, 
psychology, or – as Faria (this volume) explores – architecture departments, and the 
picture will be very di#erent.
4 We might see forms of reduction as ‘abstractions’, in the terms outlined by the 
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. 
5 Research is also always the opposite, namely expansive, in the sense that each research 
project, each piece of writing, adds something to the world that wasn’t there before. 
Research inevitably does both: reducing the world to a selection of relevant terms and 
observations and expanding the world by adding to the existing set of ideas. Even the 
most ‘reductionist’ theory works against itself, since with its publication the world is not 
reduced but enlarged. 
6 An overview of the latest round of FP7 (Framework Programme 7) research projects 
can be found here <h"p://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ssh/project_en.html>, and those 
funded by the European Research Council can be found here <h"p://erc.europa.eu/
erc-funded-projects>.
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